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The Problem of Secular Sacredness:  
Ronald Dworkin, Michael Perry, and  
Human Rights Foundationalism
Ari Kohen
The concept of human rights ultimately rests on the premise that there are some things that ought to be done for human beings and other things that ought not 
to be done to human beings in light of the fact that they are human. According to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these rights stem from the “recogni-
tion of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family” (Ishay 1997: 407). Some would argue that this notion has its 
roots in the natural law and natural rights tradition that is an important strand 
of Western political thought,1 and others would point out that Eastern philoso-
phy neither ignores nor is fundamentally opposed to the concept of rights.2 Alter-
nately, many people would claim that human rights have their origin in the Jew-
ish and Christian traditions, whereas others would argue that nearly every major 
religion has its version of the Golden Rule.3 It may well be from the insistence that 
we treat others as we wish to be treated ourselves that we can deduce the rights 
we have today, but there is also a long-standing debate about whether rights can 
be found in traditional religious texts at all. In examining the Bible, for example, 
we might conclude instead that people have duties to one another—and to God—
but no rights, per se.4 To put a finer point on it, there are injunctions against kill-
ing and stealing in the Old Testament, but these do not necessarily correspond to 
rights to life and property; likewise, the New Testament encourages men to treat 
one another as they themselves want to be treated but does not provide a mecha-
nism for anyone to claim injury in the event that they do not. In other words, these 
ancient religious texts do not seem to speak in the language of rights to which we 
have become accustomed. At the same time, strands of every major world religion 
seem to be quite supportive of the notion of inherent dignity, which underlies our 
contemporary understanding of human rights. 
To say that religious texts are inclusive of human rights is very different from 
saying, as Michael Perry does, that a religious world view provides the only in-
telligible grounding for those rights. Indeed, the most provocative question is not 
whether the concept exists in each of the world’s religions but whether it can exist 
independently of religion. As Perry (1998: 13) asks, 
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What are we to make of such talk: talk about “the inherent dignity” of all hu-
man beings—about all human beings as members of one “family”—and about 
the importance, therefore, of all human beings acting toward one another “in 
a spirit of brotherhood”? It is easy enough to understand such talk as religious 
talk …. But is it possible, finally, to understand such talk in a nonreligious (“sec-
ular”) sense?
Others have attempted to answer these questions before, and in the first section 
of this article, the discussion focuses on a secular conception of human rights, as 
outlined by Ronald Dworkin. The second section considers Michael Perry’s objec-
tions to Dworkin’s theory of secular sacredness, whereas the final section presents 
my rebuttal to Perry’s questions, quoted above, about the idea of human rights 
being a fundamentally religious one. Although both Dworkin and Perry suggest 
that human rights are based on sacredness, I argue that human dignity actually 
provides the foundation and that—contrary to existing theoretical work on this 
subject—sacredness and dignity should not be treated as synonyms.
Toward a Secular Conception of “Sacred”
In writing about the debates surrounding abortion and euthanasia, Ronald 
Dworkin (1994: 195) asserts that “there is a secular as well as a religious inter-
pretation of the idea that human life is sacred.” The religious version of hu-
man sacredness, Dworkin (1994: 79) notes, is easy enough to understand, be-
cause it is based on the notion that all livings things are “imaginative designs 
produced by God’s inspired genius, to be honored as such.” His secular vision, 
however, is considerably more complicated and is evaluated in greater detail 
below. Dworkin’s (1994: 155) core claim is that “most people who are not reli-
gious also have general, instinctive convictions about whether, why, and how 
any human life has intrinsic value.” Irrespective of the chain of reasoning be-
hind it, Dworkin argues, most people acknowledge the intrinsic value of hu-
man life.5 At bottom, we believe that “it is intrinsically regrettable when human 
life, once begun, ends prematurely. We believe, in other words, that a prema-
ture death is bad in itself, even when it is not bad for any particular person” 
(Dworkin 1994: 68–69). Although he admits that there is a powerful critique of 
the idea of intrinsic value—simply put, that “objects or events can be valuable 
only when and because they serve someone’s or something’s interests” (Dwor-
kin 1994: 69; italics mine)—he believes that he can provide a persuasive answer. 
“Something is intrinsically valuable,” Dworkin (1994: 71) suggests, “if its value 
is independent of what people happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good 
for them.” He notes that we often regard events and objects as being valuable 
in themselves and that, therefore, the idea is a familiar one to us; examples in-
clude “knowledge, experience, art, and nature” (Dworkin 1994: 71). However, 
he takes care to distinguish between these sorts of things, that are valuable in-
crementally, and things—like human life itself—that he suggests are “sacred or 
inviolable values” (Dworkin 1994: 70). In other words, although we believe that 
the more knowledge or experience we have the better, we believe differently 
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about simply creating as much human life as possible: “It is not important that 
there be more people. But once a human life has begun, it is very important that 
it flourish and not be wasted” (Dworkin 1994: 74). 
Some people may intuitively understand Dworkin’s claim that certain things 
are valuable in themselves, regardless of whether this encourages us to increase 
our inventory of them or simply value those that are already in existence.6 Perry 
(1998: 26) concludes, however, that “[t]he notion that something is valuable in-
dependently of a beneficial relation to anyone or anything—whether a human 
being, a nonhuman but living entity, or God—is perfectly opaque.” It is, he 
notes, illogical to claim that something might be valuable in itself and, at the 
same time, have no value for anyone, as Dworkin seems to suggest. Instead, 
Perry (1998: 26) argues that something is intrinsically valuable when it “has 
value for someone (or something) not merely as a means to an end but as an end in 
itself.” Strangely, the italicized portion of this quotation is less important to this 
discussion than the words that precede it, for the main difference between his 
and Dworkin’s definitions of intrinsic value is that Perry maintains that things 
can only be intrinsically valuable if they have value for someone or something. 
Dworkin, he suggests, might have wanted to say that human life is objectively 
valuable, which would be “to say that something has value for someone (for ex-
ample, that it is good for her, that it is conducive to or perhaps even constitu-
tive of her flourishing) even if she is unaware that it has value for her—indeed, even 
if she believes that it has disvalue for her” (Perry 1998: 26). On my reading, Dwor-
kin has indeed substituted intrinsic for objective value, setting the former in op-
position to subjective value and omitting the latter entirely, but he has done so 
without equating value with benefit in the way that Perry insists he must. To 
do so, Dworkin (1994: 71) seems to suggest, would require yet another type of 
value: “Something is instrumentally important if its value depends on its useful-
ness.” He notes, “David Hume and many other philosophers insisted that ob-
jects or events can be valuable only when and because they serve someone’s or 
something’s interests. On this view, nothing is valuable unless someone wants 
it or unless it helps someone get what he does want” (Dworkin 1994: 69). But, as 
Perry (1994: 178) argues,
The second sentence here is a glaring non sequitur. It does not follow, from 
the Humean view, that nothing is valuable unless someone wants it or unless 
it helps someone get what he does want. It follows only that nothing is valu-
able unless it serves someone’s or something’s interests. That something serves 
my interests does not entail that I want it (or that it helps me get what I do 
want). After all, I may not know that something serves my interests, or I may 
not know what my real interests are. Indeed, that I want something (or that it 
helps me get what I do want) does not entail that it serves my interests: I may 
want things that are not good for me—indeed, that are bad for me.
This trouble over the definition of intrinsic value is only the beginning of the dis-
agreement between the two theorists. And the burden seems to fall on Dworkin 
(1994: 69), who says he will provide an answer to questions like, “How can it be 
important that a life continue unless that life is important for or to someone?” 
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To answer this question, we must turn to Dworkin’s suggestion that the cur-
rent controversies over abortion and euthanasia can be traced to the fact that 
most people hold human life sacred. Although we generally associate “sacred” 
with the religious idea of holiness, Dworkin (1993: 36) argues that the sacredness 
of human beings can be held as a “secular but deep philosophical belief” rather 
than one that is necessarily religious in origin. Something might be held sacred 
when we attach a certain value to it, when we hold it in very high esteem. Per-
ry’s (1998: 26) initial rebuttal of this notion of secular sacredness is that intrin-
sic value, using his definition of the term, is necessary but not sufficient to es-
tablish sacredness: “An end to my itch has both objective and intrinsic value for 
me, but it is not thereby sacred.” The reply that remains to Dworkin is that Per-
ry’s definition of intrinsic value is simply not as strenuous as his own. Under his 
own definition, intrinsic value is both a necessary and sufficient condition for sa-
credness, whereas Perry deliberately weakens his definition to leave room for the 
very problem he then demonstrates. The further challenge that Perry (1998: 26) 
presents to Dworkin, however, is a more difficult and engaging one: “For some 
persons who count themselves religious, to say that every human being is sacred 
is to say (speaking analogically) that every human being is the beloved child of 
God (God who is love). For persons who do not count themselves religious, what 
does it mean to say that every human being is sacred?” Unlike its predecessor, 
this challenge goes a great distance in pressing Dworkin’s conclusions and pro-
vides a platform for this article’s inquiry into the relation of human rights and 
human sacredness.
For Dworkin (1994: 74), “something is sacred or inviolable when its deliber-
ate destruction would dishonor what ought to be honored.” although this defi-
nition is not particularly helpful, the expansion that he undertakes is instructive. 
There are, Dworkin asserts, two ways in which something might be considered 
sacred. The first, sacredness by association, is explained through the example of 
flags and other national symbols: “Many Americans consider the flag sacred be-
cause of its conventional association with the life of the nation; the respect they 
believe they owe their country is transferred to the flag” (Dworkin 1994: 74). The 
second, sacredness based on creation, can be demonstrated by looking at our at-
titude toward endangered species or cultures.7 It is this second understanding of 
sacredness that Dworkin suggests is behind the feeling most people have about 
not wasting human life. This language of creation, he acknowledges, immediately 
brings to mind the notion that human beings are sacred because each is a child of 
God. He argues, however, that the same conservationist result can be obtained by 
secular means (Dworkin 1994: 76):
For most Americans, and for many people in other countries, the evolutionary 
process is quite literally creative, for they believe that God is the author of na-
ture. On that assumption, causing a species to disappear, wholly to be lost, is 
destroying a creative design of the most exalted artist of all. But even people 
who do not take that view, but who accept instead the Darwinian thesis that 
the evolution of species is a matter of accidental mutation rather than divine de-
sign, nevertheless often use artistic metaphors of creation. They describe dis-
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crete animal species as not just accidents but as achievements of adaptation, as 
something that nature has not just produced but wrought.
There is an unmistakable connection drawn here between art and life. Indeed, 
the crux of Dworkin’s (1994: 82) argument is that “each developed human be-
ing is the product not just of natural [divine or evolutionary] creation, but also of 
the kind of deliberative human creative force that we honor in honoring art.” The 
first part of this claim is straightforward enough; human beings, he suggests, are 
considered sacred because they are the highest biological form of life. The second, 
however, requires some unpacking. What does it mean to say that each individ-
ual life results from deliberately applied human creativity? Here, Dworkin moves 
beyond the idea of sacredness as given to human beings by virtue of their biology 
(whether influenced directly by God or through natural processes) and focuses 
on sacredness as produced by human beings.
It is this move, from created to creating, that provides Dworkin with the most 
interesting component of his secular claim. He argues that both the decision to 
have a child and the child’s life itself are creative endeavors. He notes that “a de-
liberate decision of parents to have and bear a child is of course a creative one. 
Any surviving child is shaped in character and capacity by the decisions of par-
ents and by the cultural background of community” (Dworkin 1994: 83). It is not 
immediately clear, though, why Dworkin believes that the sacredness of persons 
flows from the decision of parents to have a child or from their shaping of its 
character. To provide a more thorough explanation of his word choice, Dworkin 
(1994: 83) returns to the idea of life as artwork: “As that child matures, in all but 
pathological cases, his own creative choices progressively determine his thoughts, 
personality, ambitions, emotions, connections, and achievements. He creates his 
life just as much as an artist creates a painting or a poem.” This idea—that hu-
man beings shape their lives and, in a sense, create themselves—is the grounding 
of Dworkin’s secular usage of sacredness. Of course, because his multipart def-
inition contains both religious and secular elements, Dworkin is confident that 
it is sufficiently inclusive to command the respect of the religious and nonreli-
gious alike. He is certainly correct in his assumption that those who believe that 
each human being is a child of God will agree with his claims about the sacred-
ness of persons. Dworkin’s nonreligious claim may not perform its function as ef-
fectively, however. Indeed, the process as outlined is certainly a creative one, but 
we might be justified in wondering whether it makes human life sacred or simply 
beautiful, unique, or important.
Michael Perry’s Objection
The crux of Perry’s complaint about Dworkin’s secular sacredness proceeds 
from the assertion that a human life is a work of art made valuable as a result 
of natural and human investments. Summarizing the problem, he says, “Let us 
agree that every human being is a creative masterpiece and, as such, inspires (or 
should inspire) awe in us. That something justifiably inspires awe in us, how-
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ever—James Joyce’s Ulysses, for example—entails neither that we believe it to 
be sacred nor that it is sacred” (Perry 1998: 27). For Perry, a sacred thing is one 
which—due to its sacredness—inspires awe in us and that, consequently, we 
value highly.8 Dworkin, however, reverses the order, suggesting that something 
is held sacred in response to its inherent value, to the awe it inspires in us. The 
problem with this reversal, according to Perry, is that it makes secular sacred-
ness entirely subjective. Dworkin, he suggests, appeals to no objective standard 
in his argument for secular sacredness and thus leaves himself open to the pos-
sibility that others simply will not believe as he does about the value of human-
kind. He argues that “Dworkin seems to be using ‘sacred’ in what we can call a 
weak, or ‘subjective,’ sense—something (e.g., a human life) is sacred because, or in 
the sense that, it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to it—rather than in 
the strong, or ‘objective,’ sense—something is sacred and therefore it inspires awe 
in us and we attach great value to it” (Perry 1998: 28). To add specificity, Perry 
asks that we imagine using Dworkin’s secular concept of human sacredness to 
change someone’s mind about the human rights violation he is about to commit. 
He hopes that, in thinking through the discussion we might have with a Bosnian 
Serb intent on raping a Bosnian Muslim, we will come to the conclusion that an 
appeal to some objective standard carries more weight (Perry 1998: 28):
If “sacred” is meant in the subjective sense, the Bosnian Serb can reply: “Sacred 
to you and yours, perhaps, but not to me and mine. In the scheme of things, we 
happen not to attach much value to her life.” By contrast, “sacred” in the objec-
tive sense is not fundamentally a matter of “sacred to you” or “sacred to me”; it 
is, rather, a matter of how things really are … . If every human being is sacred 
in the objective sense, then, in violating the Bosnian Muslim, the Bosnian Serb 
does not merely violate what some of us attach great value to; he violates the 
very order of creation.
Although Perry’s point is a compelling one, and one that Dworkin does not ad-
dress, I am not entirely convinced that he has presented the knock-down argu-
ment to Dworkin’s secular claim. Instead, Perry has raised three interesting and 
interrelated problems for himself with this example.
First, we might ask whether Perry is actually responding to Dworkin on his 
own terms. Because Perry questioned the definition of intrinsic value that Dwor-
kin put forward and then simply proceeded with his own instead, he now misses 
an important component of Dworkin’s argument. In failing to show conclusively 
that intrinsically valuable things must have value for someone or something, 
Perry leaves Dworkin free to argue that human life is valuable in itself and, in 
that respect, to provide an answer to the imagined Bosnian Serb. Nowhere, af-
ter all, does Dworkin suggest that skeptical people ought to be convinced that hu-
man life is sacred simply because it is valuable to him (or to us). Instead, Dwor-
kin claims that human life is intrinsically valuable—valuable in itself—and, in 
doing so, he manages to side-step Perry’s charge of subjectivity. Indeed, Dwor-
kin’s entire argument that human lives be considered creative masterpieces is his 
attempt to show that it is, in fact, possible for something to be valuable without 
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its having value for anyone in particular. We are entitled, of course, to question 
whether Dworkin actually succeeds in demonstrating the intrinsic value of hu-
man life. And, indeed, a compelling case can be made against Dworkin on this 
question of intrinsic value. He has not, in fact, shown anywhere that events or ob-
jects should be considered valuable in and of themselves.9 He has, however, as-
serted that we believe some events or objects are valuable in this way. But is this 
sufficient to convince those who do not?
This question spills directly into the second problem, namely that in adding 
the concrete example of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Perry has altered his project 
in an important way. Rather than seeking to demonstrate that the only intelligible 
version of human rights is one that has its roots in religion, Perry now entertains 
the hope of convincing others of the virtues of the contemporary international 
human rights regime. That these are two very different projects is demonstrated 
nicely by Christopher Eberle in his discussion of moral obligation stemming from 
the Divine Command Theory (DCT). He notes that “Even if the Divine Command 
theorist can’t justify the DCT to anyone else, it’s possible that she’s justified in ad-
hering to the DCT: given the particularities of her epistemic condition, and in par-
ticular, given the other theistic claims she affirms, it’s possible that her perspec-
tive on the world entitles her to believe that the DCT is true” (Eberle 2003: 4). This 
is very much in line with an argument that Perry makes in a recent essay about 
the religious nature of the notion of human inviolability. He sketches out the be-
lief system of a woman whose faith helps her to love even those who are the most 
unfamiliar or remote, as well as those who harm her: “Sarah loves even those 
from whom she is most estranged and towards whom she feels most antagonis-
tic: those whose ideologies and projects and acts she judges to be not merely mor-
ally objectionable, but morally abominable” (Perry 2005: 112–113). In agreement 
with Eberle, Perry (2005: 141) notes that “Sarah’s religious position is embedded 
in—and it has whatever plausibility or implausibility it has because of its embed-
dedness in—a broader family of religious claims, especially the claims that (a) ev-
ery human being is a beloved child of God and a sister or brother to one’s self and 
(b) human beings are created by God to love one another.”
The heart of the matter, then, is that Sarah and the Divine Command theorist 
are free to believe whatever it is that they would like to believe—just as I may jus-
tify my own beliefs in any way I might like—but they ought not assume that any-
one else will be convinced by the same reasoning that convinces them. In our at-
tempts to justify our beliefs to others, we ultimately reach a point beyond which 
we can rationally argue no further. This is true whether our beliefs are based in 
religion, nature, or reason. Even Immanuel Kant (1993: 61–62), upon completing 
his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, recognized this problem:
Now it is an essential principle of all use of our reason to push its knowledge 
to a consciousness of its necessity (for without necessity there would be no ra-
tional knowledge). But there is an equally essential restriction of the same rea-
son that it cannot have insight into the necessity either of what is or what does 
happen or of what should happen, unless there is presupposed a condition un-
der which it is or does happen or should happen. In this way, however, the sat-
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isfaction of reason is only further and further postponed by the continual in-
quiry after the condition. Reason, therefore, restlessly seeks the unconditionally 
necessary and sees itself compelled to assume this without having any means of 
making such necessity conceivable; reason is happy enough if only it can find a 
concept which is compatible with this assumption … . And so even though we 
do not indeed grasp the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imper-
ative, we do nevertheless grasp its inconceivability. This is all that can be fairly 
asked of a philosophy which strives in its principles to reach the very limit of 
human reason.
Sarah, the Divine Command theorist, and Kant, must all eventually say, with 
Wittgenstein (1968: 85), “If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bed-
rock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I 
do.’”
Perry (2003), however, is critical of those—like Dworkin—who would attempt 
to convince others of the rightness of human sacredness either without first suc-
cessfully specifying their source of normativity or whose source of normativity 
“doesn’t withstand scrutiny even on its own (secular) terms.” On this point, that 
there is something incomplete about the nonreligious argument, Perry notes that 
the assertion that all human beings are sacred and, as a result, inviolable, is sim-
ply a statement of the theorist’s own preference for a world in which these beliefs 
are honored. The problem, however, is that this preference for a world that re-
spects human rights does not necessarily line up with nonreligious beliefs about 
the way the world works. In agreement with Perry on this point is Jeffrie Murphy 
(1988: 247–248), who notes that “Liberal theorists have a self-destructive tendency 
to be charmed by views that undermine their own central doctrines—for exam-
ple, a failure to realize that the liberal virtues of value pluralism and value toler-
ance may undermine the absolutism about human rights upon which liberalism 
ultimately depends.” According to Perry (2005: 141–142), the problem is not sim-
ply one of competing liberal virtues; instead, it goes as deep as these theorists’ 
core beliefs:
It is a presupposition of the nonreligious position that the universe is just what 
Clarence Darrow and Steven Weinberg (among others) have proclaimed it to 
be: a cosmic process bereft of ultimate meaning … . Far from being created 
“in the image of God,” human beings are merely the unplanned, unintended 
yield of random mutation and natural selection. But, lo and behold, it just hap-
pens that the evolved nature of human beings is such that being a person who 
“loves one another just as I have loved you” is the most deeply satisfying way 
of life of which human beings are capable. This free floating nonreligious po-
sition seems so ad hoc, as if those who espouse the position were determined 
to cleave to a consoling belief about human nature long after the religious vi-
sion in which the belief has traditionally been embedded has ceased to have, for 
them, credibility.
Perry charges, in other words, that nonreligious thinkers have embraced a cos-
mology that looks upon human existence as the product of random chance but 
hope to maintain a foundation for the idea of human rights. The problem is that 
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such a contingent picture of human nature does not provide a solid enough 
grounding for human rights; this view, he argues, cannot possibly prove effective 
in the face of counterclaims by human rights abusers. This is a valid critique, but 
the religious position—despite specifying a source of normativity—also offers no 
assistance when the task is persuading those with different beliefs. Sarah believes 
that “By becoming [people who love one another as God loves us], we fulfill—we 
perfect—our created nature and thereby achieve our truest, deepest, and most en-
during happiness. That fact, coupled with our commitment to our own authen-
tic well being, is, according to Sarah, the source of normativity” (Perry 2005: 140). 
The problem, of course, is that Sarah’s source of normativity is the result of her 
own deep yet personal religious commitment, a commitment that she cannot re-
ally justify to others in a convincing manner. As Perry (2003) notes, “Sarah speci-
fies the source of normativity—though, of course, if one is a nonbeliever, or a be-
liever of the ‘wrong’ sort, the source Sarah specifies will not move one.”
This yields the third—and, in my opinion, most interesting—problem that 
Perry’s critique raises. Indeed, it offers us an entrée into the central argument that 
underlies The Idea of Human Rights. In his critique of Dworkin, Perry (1998: 28) in-
sists that “The premise that every human being is sacred-in-the-subjective-sense 
cannot begin to bear the weight of the premise that every human being is sacred-
in- the-objective-sense.” By stating his objection in this manner, he alludes to the 
problem discussed above: that Dworkin’s argument for secular sacredness is not 
convincing in the same way as the religious argument (or not convincing at all). 
Put succinctly, Perry contends that at the center of every human rights claim is 
the notion of the sacredness of persons, which is, contra Dworkin, a fundamen-
tally religious concept. His project is to examine the various secular understand-
ings of “the conviction that every human being is sacred—sacred in the strong/ob-
jective sense, sacred because of how the world really is, and not because of what we attach 
value to in the world” (Perry 1998: 29). But, in framing the search in this way, Perry 
sets an impossible task for others to accomplish. The closest that Dworkin (1994: 
73) comes to succeeding is in his discussion of intrinsic value, where he poses a 
question that is notable for its conditional wording: “If it is a horrible desecration 
to destroy a painting, for example, even though a painting is not a person, why 
should it not be a much greater desecration to destroy something whose intrin-
sic value may be vastly greater?” Were he to remove the conditional wording and 
answer this question, which he does not, he would still fail in his project of sug-
gesting a secular understanding of human sacredness. The best answer Dworkin 
can give is one he gave earlier: destroying a person would be a much greater des-
ecration than destroying a painting based on the fact that we believe human lives 
to be intrinsically valuable or sacred, which is itself based on our belief that hu-
man beings are the most creative species in existence. But this is not the same as 
arguing that human beings actually are valuable in and of themselves, nor will it 
convince those with radically opposing beliefs to change their minds. How, after 
all, can we talk about something having intrinsic value in the absence of some ex-
ternal and unchanging measuring tool? As Perry (1998: 28) asks, “How do we get 
from ‘the universe is (or might be) nothing but a cosmic process bereft of ultimate 
meaning’ to ‘every human being is nonetheless sacred (in the strong or objective 
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sense)’?” How, in other words, might a human life be both sacred and low-level 
nuclear waste? To show that something is secular and sacred in the sense that 
Perry wants, one must actually show that it is religiously secular, which would—
of course—defeat the purpose.
The idea that something might be secular and religious at once is a difficult 
one to grasp and requires some investigation. The most fruitful way to do so is to 
continue our detailed examination of Perry’s argument to see how he creates this 
puzzle. Both Perry and Dworkin attempt to draw political conclusions from the 
notion of the sacredness of persons. Just as Dworkin hopes to find a grounding 
for the debate about abortion and euthanasia, Perry wants to highlight the foun-
dation of universal human rights. Dworkin, according to Perry (1998: 28, italics 
mine), has failed to show “that either a secular cosmology or cosmological athe-
ism can yield the requisite conviction about how things really are.” Although we 
can certainly question whether this was ever Dworkin’s intent, we must also con-
sider the reasonableness of Perry’s demand. Is it possible, in the end, for secular-
ists—people like Clarence Darrow or Steven Weinberg—to give to us a defini-
tive answer about the nature of the universe? It seems unlikely that either could 
provide the sort of answer that Perry desires. Their inability to do so, however, 
threatens to leave the contemporary human rights regime with a severely eroded 
foundation, for Perry (1998: 12) insists on the intimate connection between hu-
man sacredness and human rights. In his own words: “The conviction that every 
human being is sacred is, in my view, inescapably religious—and the idea of hu-
man rights is, therefore, ineliminably religious.” But what exactly is the connec-
tion between the sacredness of persons and the idea of human rights?
The question of whether there is something inherent in human beings from 
which our rights spring is fundamental to any attempt at understanding human 
rights claims. As Perry (1998: 30–31) says, “The fundamental challenge to each 
and every human rights claim … is a demand for reasons.” Indeed, this article 
began with an effort to trace the notion of grounding our rights and noted that 
one can look at least as far back as the Stoics in doing so. The importance of this 
search is nicely elucidated by Perry (1998: 13), who contends that “there is some-
thing about each and every human being, simply as a human being, such that certain 
choices should be made and certain other choices rejected; in particular, certain things 
ought not to be done to any human being and certain other things ought to be done 
for every human being.” Despite overwhelming agreement that something about 
us is surely responsible for our having rights, theorists have not often been in 
agreement about what exactly that something might be. Enlightenment think-
ers conclude that it is our ability to use reason; theologians suggest that it is our 
status as children of God, made in His image. And, of course, international hu-
man rights documents contend that it is our dignity that sets us apart from all 
of the other species.
For Perry, the foundational component of the idea of human rights is the con-
viction that every human being is sacred; it clearly relies, he argues, on a spiritual 
belief of one kind or another to be intelligible. Regardless of whether he is correct 
on that score, Perry (1998: 31) is surely correct that 
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The fundamental challenge to human rights claims is a real-world challenge: 
Many to whom such claims are addressed have conspicuously not adopted 
anything like “the moral (impartial, universal) point of view.” The moral point 
of view is not a justificatory basis for human rights claims—at least not a funda-
mental basis. The moral point of view is itself in dire need of justification, espe-
cially in a world—our world, the real world—that is often fiercely partial/local 
rather than impartial/universal. His religious understanding of the sacredness 
of persons is an attempt at providing just such a justification. It represents, in 
his view, the only intelligible way to answer “what David Tracy has called the 
‘limit-question’ of morality: ‘Why be moral at all?’” (Perry 1998: 30).
As we have seen, Dworkin’s secular conception of sacredness fails to provide a 
satisfactory answer to this question. Robert Grant (1993: 11) concludes a bit more 
forcefully that, “In Life’s Dominion, Professor Dworkin makes considerable play 
with, indeed frankly exploits, the idea of the sacred, but shows no understanding 
of it.” Indeed, considerable difficulties arise over his unconventional definition 
of intrinsic value and over his idea that each of us holds in higher esteem one of 
the two investments that make something sacred. In addition, and perhaps most 
importantly, there is the problem of subjectivity to which Dworkin’s secular sa-
credness falls prey. As Perry (1998: 28) points out, “The premise that every hu-
man being is sacred-in-the-subjective-sense cannot begin to bear the weight of the 
premise that every human being is sacred-in-the-objective-sense.” That said, it is 
important to avoid tossing away Dworkin’s contribution entirely. Though some-
what the worse for wear on the question of sacredness, there is a very valuable 
point that Life’s Dominion raises, namely the idea of self-creation. As discussed 
earlier, Dworkin argues that human life is valuable because of the creative contri-
butions of both nature and humanity. The key component of this argument is the 
latter notion, the idea that each human being is created by her culture and com-
munity, as well as her own thoughts. On this point, Dworkin’s (1994: 84) ideas 
are very well-articulated:
The life of a single human organism commands respect and protection, then, 
no matter in what form or shape, because of the complex creative investment 
it represents and because of our wonder at the … processes of nation and com-
munity and language through which a human being will come to absorb and 
continue hundreds of generations of culture and forms of life and value, and, fi-
nally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal per-
sonal creation and judgment by which a person will make and remake himself, 
a mysterious, inescapable process in which we each participate, and which is 
therefore the most powerful and inevitable source of empathy and communion 
we have with every other creature who faces the same frightening challenge.
Put succinctly, each human life is inherently valuable because human beings are 
self-creating; they are, in Dworkin’s view, a source of value in the way that God 
or nature might be for others. Dworkin, then, offers an interesting contribution 
about the possibilities of human creativity and his work is valuable to our discus-
sion if only for that. More than that, though, the task that Perry assigns to nonreli-
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gious theorists (and that Dworkin sets for himself)—of providing a coherent secu-
lar understanding of a deeply religious concept—may very well be an impossible 
one and Dworkin’s failure in this respect should not be emphasized excessively.
Although we have already looked, in detail, at these challenges to Dworkin’s 
theory and at the problem of secularizing the concept of sacredness, we have not 
dealt with Perry’s understanding of sacredness in its entirety. A crucial point left 
for us to consider is that Perry’s conception of human sacredness can be said to 
encompass a number of the aforementioned “somethings” on which our rights 
rely. More specifically, Perry suggests that rights claims all rely on the notion that 
human beings are sacred, which is—in turn—based on the idea that we are the 
children of God. In addition, Perry contends that the sacredness of persons can 
be equated with the concept of inherent dignity that is highlighted in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. His contention, however, is merely im-
plied, for Perry (1998: 13) puts the two together only once—in a question—at the 
very beginning of his argument: “Or must we conclude that the idea of human 
rights is indeed ineliminably religious, that a fundamental constituent of the idea, 
namely, the conviction that every human being is sacred—that every human being is ‘in-
violable,’ has ‘inherent dignity,’ is ‘an end in himself,’ or the like—is inescapably reli-
gious?” Perry seems to suggest that dignity and sacredness are, in fact, synonyms 
for one another. But this is too large an assumption, in my estimation, and too 
much hinges on it. Put succinctly, Perry wants to demonstrate that the sacredness 
of persons can only be understood religiously. Doing so, he claims, will mean 
that the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious. He fails to show, however, 
how it is that sacredness is necessarily connected to the idea of human rights; it 
is, instead, one of many possible foundations. Simply putting all these possibili-
ties together and implying that they are derivative of human sacredness does not 
properly constitute an argument. 
In a later chapter of his book, Perry is more forthcoming about his view of the 
connection between international law and the sacredness of persons. Indeed, he 
argues that the former is clearly derived from the latter: “Why is the good of ev-
ery human being an end worth pursuing in its own right? … One answer—the 
answer that informs the international law of human rights—is that the good of 
every human being is an end worth pursuing in its own right because every human 
being is sacred” (Perry 1998: 60). The problem, however, is that none of the inter-
national human rights documents actually uses this term. In fact, the language he 
examines from the International Bill of Human Rights does not contain the word 
“sacred” anywhere. As Perry (1998: 12) himself notes,
The … Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), speaks, in the Preamble, of 
“the inherent dignity … of all members of the human family” and of “the dignity 
and worth of the human person.” In Article 1, the Declaration proclaims: “All 
human beings … should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” … 
The preamble common to both [the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1976) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (1976)] echoes the Universal Declaration in speaking of “the inherent dig-
nity … of all members of the human family.” The preamble then states: “[T]hese 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person … .” 
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It is obvious that the idea of human rights, as understood in contemporary inter-
national documents, is based on the inherent dignity of persons. It is not imme-
diately clear, however, where sacredness comes into the picture. Indeed, there is 
no mention of the sacredness of human beings in any international human rights 
document, and it is not necessarily the case that dignity and sacredness can be 
equated in the way that Perry assumes them to be.
In addition to suggesting that dignity and sacredness are intimately con-
nected, Perry further implies that dignity is a religious concept. “What are we 
to make of such talk,” he asks, “talk about ‘the inherent dignity’ of all human 
beings … and about the importance, therefore, of all human beings acting to-
ward one another ‘in a spirit of brotherhood’? It is easy enough to understand 
such talk as religious talk” (Perry 1998: 13). And Perry is not alone in conflat-
ing these terms and assigning the same religious origin to both. Murphy (1988: 
245) makes the same connection and, like Perry, does not offer an explanation 
for doing so: “The rich moral doctrine of the sacredness, the preciousness, the 
dignity of persons cannot in fact be utterly detached from the theological con-
text in which it arose and of which it for so long formed an essential part.” But 
should we assume that human dignity has the same theological foundation as 
human sacredness? In other words, are Perry and Murphy correct? Is the in-
herent dignity of persons just as religious (or religious in the same way) as the 
sacredness of persons? Perry goes to great lengths to suggest that sacredness 
is a fundamentally religious concept, but he has done nothing to conclusively 
show that dignity is similarly religious. If sacredness and dignity are not synon-
ymous with one another, then Perry has not demonstrated that the idea of hu-
man rights is ineliminably religious. A brief glance at the language of the Inter-
national Bill of Rights shows that dignity is clearly bound up with the concept 
of international human rights but not necessarily with sacredness; the latter, ac-
cording to Perry, is an inextricably religious concept, but the former has not 
been similarly evaluated.
Indeed, Australian philosopher Raimond Gaita suggests that these concepts 
cannot be used interchangeably and do not carry the same weight. He does, how-
ever, agree with Perry that sacredness is a fundamentally religious concept and 
far more powerful than dignity. He notes (2002: 23),
Only someone who is religious can speak seriously of the sacred, but such talk 
informs the thoughts of most of us whether or not we are religious … . If we are 
not religious, we will often search for one of the inadequate expressions which 
are available to us to say what we hope will be a secular equivalent of it. We 
may say that all human beings are inestimably precious, that they are ends in 
themselves, that they are owed unconditional respect, that they possess inalien-
able rights, and, of course, that they possess inalienable dignity. In my judg-
ment these are ways of trying to say what we feel a need to say when we are es-
tranged from the conceptual resources we need to say it.
Although I am quite sympathetic to Gaita’s position throughout A Common Hu-
manity, there is a problem that arises from the way in which he stakes out this par-
ticular argument, namely that the five examples of secular—and weak—versions 
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of sacredness are not themselves synonyms. On my reading, Gaita seems to be 
lumping together actions and reasons for those actions. There is, for example, a 
clear discrepancy between the notion that “all human beings are inestimably pre-
cious” and the idea “that they are owed unconditional respect.” Inestimable pre-
ciousness and inalienable dignity are similar, possibly secular, versions of the idea 
that people are sacred; the notion that people are owed unconditional respect and 
possess inalienable rights belong to an entirely different category. The difference is 
that the former concepts are the reasoning behind our believing the latter concepts. 
Indeed, the notions of sacredness and dignity are so vitally important precisely be-
cause of this difference; they provide the justification for our believing in the idea 
of human rights and the reason for our insistence that others act toward every hu-
man being as we do. Although this is problematic, however, a more pressing issue 
is whether Gaita or Perry is correct about the separation of dignity from sacred-
ness. To untangle that question, it is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of 
both terms and it is to their etymological roots that we now turn.
The Etymology of Rights
The Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson and Weiner 1989: 338–339) lists seven 
definitions of “sacred,” ranging from those that typically come to mind (“Secured 
by religious sentiment, reverence, sense of justice, or the like, against violation, 
infringement, or encroachment” and “Regarded with or entitled to respect or rev-
erence similar to that which attaches to holy things”) to those that are a bit more 
obscure (“Of the Eucharistic elements: Consecrated” and “Applied as a specific 
defining adj. to various animals and plants that are or have been considered sa-
cred to certain deities”). Indeed, there are only two definitions that do not make 
reference to religion or a deity: first, “Accursed [After L. sacer; freq. translating 
or in allusion to Virgil’s auri saca fames (Æn. III. 57)],” and second, “Dedicated, 
set apart, exclusively appropriated to some person or some special purpose” 
(Simpson and Weiner 1989: 338–339). The former provides us an opportunity to 
look into the Latin root, sacer, which—depending on context—could mean either 
“dedicated, consecrated, devoted, sacred,” “accursed, execrable, detestable, horri-
ble, infamous,” or “regarded with reverence, holy, awful, venerable” (Lewis and 
Short 1969: 1610–1611). There is, to be sure, something strange about using the 
same word to mean both accursed and holy, but solving that mystery is not our 
present purpose. Instead, it is sufficient to note that the Latin root of a nonreli-
gious definition returns us to religious language. Having done so, we can turn to 
the second of the two nonreligious definitions. Although it is not explicitly clear, 
with this definition, what might make “some person or some special purpose” sa-
cred, a look at all of the other definitions of “sacred” seems to suggest that a rela-
tionship with a deity is most likely the source.
Having looked at the term “sacred” and noted the clear connection to “holy” 
and “religious” words in both English and Latin, it remains to us to consider 
“dignity” in the same manner. The Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson and 
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Weiner 1989: 656–657) contains eight possible definitions, ranging once again 
from the very obvious (“The quality of being worthy or honourable; worthiness, 
worth, nobleness, excellence” and “Nobility or befitting elevation of aspect, 
manner, or style; becoming or fit stateliness, gravity”) to the very obscure (“A 
situation of a planet in which its influence is heightened, either by its position in 
the zodiac, or by its aspects with other planets” and “The term for a ‘company’ 
of canons”). None of the definitions makes reference to the concepts of sacred-
ness, holiness, or religion. Similarly, exploring the Latin root, dignus, does not 
help to connect sacredness and dignity; it is defined as “worthy, deserving (in 
a good or ill sense), of things, suitable, fitting, becoming, proper” (Lewis and 
Short 1969: 578). The Latin, in turn, can be traced back to the Greek δόξα, which 
is defined as “expectation, notion, judgement, whether well grounded or not” 
or “the opinion which others have of one, estimation, repute” (Liddell and Scott 
1959: 444). The only connection between “dignity” and “sacred” can be found 
in an obscure definition of “dignified,” which usually is defined as “Invested 
with dignity; exalted” or “Marked by dignity of manner, style, or appearance; 
characterized by lofty self-respect without haughtiness; stately, noble, majestic” 
(Simpson and Weiner 1989: 656). The obscure definition, “Holding a position of 
dignity; ranking as a dignitary (esp. ecclesiastical)” (Simpson and Weiner 1989: 
656), does provide a connection, albeit a very tenuous one, to a religious under-
standing of dignity.
Despite the fact that “dignified” once suggested that the clergy were highly 
ranked in society, the concept of dignity seems, on the whole, not to be related to 
the idea of human sacredness. Something is held sacred in virtue of a clear con-
nection to some other holy thing. Sacredness can apply to objects and to people, 
and it provides the foundation for inviolability. In other words, human beings 
ought not to be violated because of their connection to the divine; likewise, hu-
man beings ought to be respected in much the same way that God is respected. 
The value of the object—in this case, a person—is fixed because of its unchanging 
relationship to the source of all value, God. The concept of dignity, conversely, 
applies only to people and traditionally only to a certain sort of person. It is, tra-
ditionally understood, an aristocratic concept. Unlike sacredness, which applies 
to all of the objects that are related to God, one must be worthy, noble, or hon-
orable to be considered a bearer of dignity. One’s dignity is, it seems, based on 
what others believe; in that sense, it is very much a subjective concept, as it is 
open to interpretation by definition. That said, it is important to note that our un-
derstanding of dignity has changed considerably in the last two hundred years. 
Before the revolutions in America and France in the eighteenth century, dignity 
and its attending esteem were strictly reserved for members of the nobility. With 
the collapse of the belief that a fraction of the populace was born into a position 
of greater worth, the concept of dignity underwent a considerable expansion. The 
Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 provided a great deal of support to the idea 
that people might rightfully oppose a tyrannical government, but the American 
and French revolutionaries were the first to draw up a list of specific rights that 
applied, they said, to all men.10 
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Although the U.S. Declaration of Independence states that “all men are cre-
ated equal” (Ishay 1997: 127) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen declares that “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights” 
(Ishay 1997: 138), neither makes mention of human dignity as the basis for this 
belief. And, perhaps not surprisingly, neither Declaration went to great lengths 
to ensure that the equality of rights applied equally to everyone. Clearly, the 
problem of slavery was not dealt with at the time of the signing of the U.S. Dec-
laration, nor would it be dealt with in the lifetimes of the men who signed it. 
And, of course, the promulgation of the French Declaration was followed al-
most immediately by Robespierre’s Terror and the execution of thousands by 
guillotine (including, eventually, Robespierre himself). Only ten years after pro-
claiming the Rights of Man and Citizen, political control over France was seized 
by Napoleon Bonaparte.
Despite what can graciously be termed serious problems of implementation, 
both the American and French Declarations are unequivocal in the principles 
that serve as their guide. In addition, the French revolutionaries provide sup-
port for the connection between human rights and sacredness, stating that they 
“have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, inalienable, and 
sacred rights of man” (Ishay 1997: 138). And yet, despite the use of Perry’s ter-
minology, it is important to note that it is the rights that are sacred and not the 
people. Indeed, it is a bit of a mystery as to the reason behind the sacredness of 
the rights, which seems not to reside in the inherent equality of the people; this 
second concept, after all, requires a foundation of its own. It makes the most 
sense to assume that all men possess equally the sacred rights of “liberty, prop-
erty, security, and resistance to oppression” because of their (unstated) connec-
tion to “the Supreme Being in the presence and under the auspices of [whom]” 
the rights were affirmed by the French National Assembly (Ishay 1997: 138). A 
similarly nondescript “Creator” appears in the American Declaration as well 
and is very clearly the source of man’s “certain unalienable rights” (Ishay 1997: 
127). Of primary importance to both the American and French Declarations, 
though, are the rights themselves, not their ultimate guarantor, because their 
infringement provided a rallying cry for the revolutions and their protection 
was at the heart of the radical democratic experiment that the revolutionaries 
proposed. And in fact, both revolutions promised to usher in an era of hitherto 
unimagined civil peace and religious tolerance, based on the complete absence 
of a state-sanctioned religion.11
Still the questions remain how and why the change from “natural, inalienable, 
and sacred rights” protected by a Supreme Being to the contemporary notion of 
the inviolability of persons based on their inherent dignity? I submit that a pri-
mary reason for the change is that, historically, the rights have not been held in 
practice to be particularly sacred. The UN Charter seems to bear this idea out:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-
time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamen-
tal human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person … 
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Have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims (Ishay 1997: 
406).
Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins by noting that “dis-
regard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind” (Ishay 1997: 407). Given the propensity that 
human beings have had, especially in the last century, for violating the rights en-
shrined in the American and French Declarations, the United Nations proposed a 
new way of understanding the duties that governments had to their citizens and, 
conversely, the rights those citizens could claim.12 According to Schulz (2002: 26), 
“What the Universal Declaration supplies all of us are rights in the form of norms 
to which every person can appeal, rights that … are designed to depict the best 
way we know of at the moment to counter cruelty and build a decent society.” In-
deed, a statement by Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the Human Rights Commis-
sion that drafted the Universal Declaration, does much to confirm that its drafters 
appreciated the Declaration’s revolutionary character:
We stand today at the threshold of a great event both in the life of the United 
Nations and in the life of mankind … . This Declaration may well become the 
international Magna Carta of all men everywhere. We hope its proclamation by 
the General Assembly will be an event comparable to the proclamation of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man by the French people in 1789, the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights by the people of the United States, and adoption of compara-
ble declarations at different times in other countries (Glendon 2001: 166).
In addition to this statement by Roosevelt, Charles Malik—the Lebanese phi-
losopher and politician who ultimately shepherded the Declaration through the 
General Assembly—lends support to the idea that the community of nations 
stood on entirely new ground as it considered a rights instrument with the sup-
port of the entire world behind it. According to Malik,
Thousands of minds and hands have helped in its formation. Every member of 
the United Nations has solemnly pledged itself to achieve respect for and ob-
servance of human rights. But, precisely what these rights are we were never 
told before, either in the Charter or in any other international instrument. This 
is the first time the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
spelled out authoritatively and in precise detail. I now know what my govern-
ment pledged itself to promote, achieve and observe when I had the honor to 
sign the [UN Charter]. I can agitate against my government, and if she does 
not fulfil her pledge, I shall have and feel the moral support of the entire world 
(Glendon 2001: 164).
Proposing such a list, however, is not the same as suggesting that the enumerated 
rights and the human dignity underlying them are objectively true. As Schulz 
(2002: 27) argues, “The question to ask about rights is not, Are they true? The 
question is, Do they work? Do they work to spread empathy, combat cruelty, and 
protect the weak from their oppressors? The experience of the international hu-
man rights community is that these do.” Such an argument, though, seems to 
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leave the idea of human rights on shaky ground; it is akin to admitting that, in 
fact, human rights might be a fad that could just as well not be in fashion tomor-
row. Indeed, Schulz (2002: 26) recognizes this problem:
Such a concept of rights does not lend them the kind of irrefragable authority 
that God’s will or Nature’s command might. Theoretically, the Universal Decla-
ration could be rescinded or amended. Human concepts of rights do change and 
there is no reason to believe that today’s notions and norms will be identical to 
those of the twenty-second century any more than our norms are identical to 
those of the nineteenth.
This argument—that the idea of human rights and the human dignity that 
grounds it is constructed and therefore changeable—is one that is anathema to 
both Michael Perry and Ronald Dworkin, as both argue for the importance of a 
transcendent foundation for rights, one that is ultimately grounded in some fea-
ture or quality of humanity. The secular foundation that Dworkin proposes, how-
ever, is flawed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it misunder-
stands the concept of sacredness on which it is based. But the task that he sets 
for himself and that Perry argues he fails to complete seems to me to be one that 
is both impossible and unnecessary. It is impossible, I argue, because the idea of 
secular sacredness is one that cannot be made sense of; it is unnecessary, I believe, 
because the concept of sacredness is not required to ground the idea of human 
rights in the way that Perry suggests. It is, instead, human dignity upon which 
the International Bill of Rights stands and it is possible that the concept of dignity 
for all humanity is a very recent development. Schulz, who is both a theorist and 
a practitioner of human rights, embraces the idea that we have recently estab-
lished the ground upon which our rights stand and contends that this seemingly 
tenuous position need not dull the luster of human rights. Although this theory 
might not provide the sort of objectively strong defense that Perry requires, it is 
clear that no truly secular theory will be able to do so.
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Notes
1. According to Weston (2002: 656), “Most students of human rights trace the historical origins of the 
concept back to ancient Greece and Rome, where it was closely tied to the pre-modern natural law 
doctrines of Greek Stoicism (the school of philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium, which held that 
a universal working force pervades all creation and that human conduct therefore should be judged 
according to, and brought into harmony with, the law of nature).” 
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2. There are a wide variety of quotations from Eastern thinkers to support this point. Among my fa-
vorites are those pointed out by Schulz (2002: 183), that “Confucius himself asserted that ‘an op-
pressive government is worse than a tiger,’ ” and Glendon (2001: 74), that “The Bengali Muslim 
poet and philosopher Humayin Kabir sounded a universalist note in writing about human rights 
and the Islamic tradition. Kabir proudly recalled that early Islam had ‘succeeded in overcoming 
distinction of race and colour to an extent experienced neither before nor since.’ ” Of course, Schulz 
(2002: 183) goes on to point out the so-called Asian values critique of human rights, namely that “to 
advance human rights around the globe is to try to impose American values on other people and 
hence should be avoided has a certain logical ring to it. Mao was raised in the Chinese tradition. 
The Chinese tradition has no concept of human rights. To expect Mao to abide by them, therefore, 
is not only unfair but reflects an attempt to foist Western values on a different culture. The Chinese 
Communist Party may decree, as indeed it has, that Mao’s merits outweigh his mistakes by a pro-
portion of 7 to 3, but making judgments like that is not up to outsiders.” Although Schulz clearly 
disagrees with this sort of logic, Glendon (2001: 73–74) offers a more powerful disagreement with 
those, like Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, who argue that the idea of human rights is a Western con-
struct that does not apply to Asian cultures: “The absence of formal declarations of rights in China, 
said Confucian philosopher Chung-Shu Lo, did not signify ‘that the Chinese never claimed human 
rights or enjoyed the basic rights of man.’ He explained: ‘[T]he problem of human rights was sel-
dom discussed by Chinese thinkers of the past, at least in the same way as it was in the West. There 
was no open declaration of human rights in China, either by individual thinkers or by political con-
stitutions, until this conception was introduced from the West. … [However], the idea of human 
rights developed very early in China, and the right of the people to revolt against oppressive rulers 
was very early established. … A great Confucianist, Mencius (372–289 B.C.), strongly maintained 
that a government should work for the will of the people. He said: ‘People are of primary impor-
tance. The State is of less importance. The sovereign is of least importance.’ ” In addition, and per-
haps even more pragmatic, are the words of Xiao Quiang, a Chinese dissident, at a 1998 Harvard 
symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “If you were 
to voice dissent from the prevailing view in China, you would end up in jail, and there you would 
soon be asking for your rights, without worrying about whether they were ‘American’ or ‘Chinese’ 
” (Glendon 2001: 232). 
3. In the Confucian Analects, “Tse-kung asked, ‘Is there one word that can serve as a principle of con-
duct for life?’ Confucius replied, ‘It is the word ‘shu’—reciprocity. Do not impose on others what 
you yourself do not desire’” (15:23). The Islamic Forty Hadiths of an-Nawawi contends that “Not one 
of you is a believer until he desires for his brother what he desires for himself” (No. 13). In the Ma-
habharata of Hinduism, it is said, “Do naught to others which, if done to thee, would cause thee 
pain: this is the sum of duty” (5.1517). The Buddhist Majjhima Nikaya declares: “Is there a deed, Ra-
hula, thou dost wish to do? Then bethink thee thus: Is this deed conducive to my own harm, or 
to others harm, or to that of both? Then is this a bad deed entailing suffering. Such a deed must 
thou surely not do” (1.415). This is by no means an exhaustive list, as it leaves out similar state-
ments from Taoism, Sikhism, Shintoism, Zoroastrianism, and many others. These quotations and 
many others can found at the Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance website: http://www.re-
ligioustolerance.org/reciproc.htm  
4. By way of an example, consider this passage about the freeing of slaves from Deuteronomy 15:12–
15: “If a fellow Hebrew, a man or a woman, sells himself to you and serves you six years, in the 
seventh year you must let him go free. And when you release him, do not send him away empty-
handed. Supply him liberally from your flock, your threshing floor and your winepress. Give to 
him as the Lord your God has blessed you. Remember that you were slaves in Egypt and the Lord 
your God redeemed you. That is why I give you this command today.” It is interesting to note, of 
course, that this commandment applies to Jewish slaves only, but more important for our present 
purpose is that there is no manner by which the slave can protest if his owner chooses to disobey 
God’s commandment and keep him in bondage for more than seven years. Any violation of the 
commandment is between God and the slave-owner; the owner clearly has a duty (to God) to re-
lease the slave, but the slave seems not to have an explicit right to his freedom. 
5. I alternate between “human being” and “human life” throughout this article, as Perry writes of 
the former and Dworkin the latter. Although I recognize that these terms are charged, particularly 
within the literature on reproductive rights, I do not take a position on whether the concept of sa-
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credness best applies to one or the other. It seems sufficient to note, for the purposes of this article, 
that it does not seem odd to refer to either the sacredness of all human life or every human being. It 
might, however, be a bit of a stretch to refer to the inherent dignity of all human life, as opposed to 
every human being, for reasons discussed in greater length later in this article. My thanks to Alli-
son Daniel Anders for a series of discussions that brought this important point to my attention. 
6. There are, however, some things that tend to blur the distinction for Dworkin. Whereas art is intrin-
sically valuable, great art is sacred and might also—on occasion—be incrementally valuable. The 
same, he suggests, might be true of great lives: “even those who are most in favor of controlling 
population growth would not want fewer Leonardo da Vincis or Martin Luther Kings” (Dworkin 
1994: 74). It seems, though, that the question of incremental value is ultimately a personal one; as 
Dworkin (1994: 74) tells us, “I do not myself wish that there were more paintings by Tintoretto than 
there are. But I would nevertheless be appalled by the deliberate destruction of even one of those 
he did paint.” It is not terribly difficult to imagine someone who yearned for more Tintorettos and 
fewer da Vincis, and it is not immediately obvious from Dworkin’s argument how this dispute 
might be adjudicated. 
7. As Tomasi (1997: 493) correctly notes, “The crucial move, according to Dworkin, is to think of the 
creative inputs in people’s lives, whether from nature (natural selection or, on some views, God’s 
work) or from humans (culture and training), not simply as contributions but as investments.” We 
can clearly understand what the investment is toward when considering a purely human invest-
ment, but it is considerably murkier with natural investments. The puzzle is that despite this diffi-
culty, most people seem quite confident about whether or not their actions are respectful of natu-
ral investment: “When human projects, directly or indirectly, threaten an entire species of animal 
(consider the ivory hunting of the African elephant or the eradication of the snail darter by the 
Tellico Dam) most people are quite sure that this is a terrible thing, an act of desecration” (Tomasi 
1997: 495). The puzzle is solved by what Tomasi terms the investment connection (IC) and, specif-
ically, by the notion that IC is severed by what he calls a cross-basal violation when one closes an in-
vestment account opened by someone else. To flesh this idea out somewhat, consider the following 
example: “When a species of tree or animal naturally goes extinct, there seems to be a great sub-
traction of nature’s creative investment. Yet people do not feel here … that such an event is a vio-
lation of the sacred … Since nature (theistic/secular) opened the account embodied in the tree spe-
cies, when nature closes the account, IC has been preserved … Imagine a different case whereby a 
community of young lumberjacks had developed a (to them) richly rewarding and meaningful life 
project centrally committed to the project of efficiently cutting down trees. Unfortunately, the re-
maining stand of some … tree species gets in their way and is destroyed … In both cases, the erad-
ication of an entire tree species involves a great subtraction from what is wonderful in the world 
… But, faced with uncertainty about what nature intends … people feel the loss in the lumberjack 
case is worse because of the way the loss comes about: that loss involves what we might call a sa-
cred violation” (Tomasi 1997: 497–498). Despite all this talk about avoiding sacred violations, Tomasi 
might not be entirely correct, as two important examples help to highlight. Although it is true that 
most people worry about the extinction of beautiful, exotic, or helpful animals, the same cannot be 
said about the possibility of killing off nature’s peskier creations. For example, mosquitoes are de-
liberately destroyed every minute of every day, and people do not so much as pause to consider 
that these creatures are a product of a great deal of natural investment. Mosquitoes are not on the 
verge of extinction, of course, but I am not confident that our decision to slap at them would change 
a great deal if they were. Similarly, few homeowners would be terribly upset if humankind found 
a way to exterminate crabgrass from the face of the planet. The distinctly human project of cultivat-
ing attractive lawns, especially when it involves strong chemicals to destroy weeds, is clearly disre-
spectful of nature’s creative investment in crabgrass. These two examples call attention to the fact 
that not all of Tomasi’s sacred violations are extremely troubling to most people; in fact, most peo-
ple seem not to be concerned in the least about these sorts of cross-basal violations. Few people, if 
any, would suggest that human beings and mosquitoes represent equivalent creative investments, 
of course, which might account for the confidence that Dworkin has in our ability to figure out how 
much respect we owe to each. 
8. There are, of course, other ways of in which people are awestruck that have no connection at all to 
sacredness. It is entirely possible for one to be filled with awe and find no value at all in the awe-
some object or event. Consider this famous description from Machiavelli (1985: 29–30): “And be-
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cause this point is deserving of notice and of being imitated by others, I do not want to leave it out. 
Once the duke had taken over Romagna, he found it had been commanded by impotent lords who 
had been readier to despoil their subjects than to correct them. … So he put there Messer Remirro 
de Orco, a cruel and ready man, to whom he gave the fullest power. In a short time Remirro re-
duced it to peace and unity, with the very greatest reputation for himself. Then the duke judged 
that such excessive authority was not necessary. … And because he knew that past rigors had gen-
erated some hatred for Remirro, to purge the spirits of that people and to gain them entirely to him-
self, he wished to show that if any cruelty had been committed, this had not come from him but 
from the harsh nature of his minister. And having seized this opportunity, he had him placed one 
morning in the piazza at Cesena in two pieces, with a piece of wood and a bloody knife beside him. 
The ferocity of this spectacle left the people at once satisfied and stupefied.” 
9. At times, Dworkin (1994: 248) seems uncertain as to his own position on whether something can 
possess value independently of anyone valuing it: “I do not mean to take any position on a further, 
very abstract philosophical issue not pertinent to this discussion: whether great paintings would 
still be valuable if intelligent life were altogether destroyed forever so that no one could ever have 
the experience of regarding paintings again. There is no inconsistency in denying that they would 
have value then, because the value of a painting lies in the kind of experience it makes available, 
while still insisting that this value is intrinsic because it does not depend on any creatures’ actually 
wanting that kind of experience.” 
10. In 1689, the English Bill of Rights recognized that “the late King James the Second, by the assis-
tance of divers evil counselors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert 
and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this kingdom” (Ishay 1997: 91). 
Although the Bill recognized that considerable violations of the citizens’ rights had occurred under 
James, it concluded “that his said highness the prince of Orange will … still preserve them from the 
violation of their rights, which they have here asserted, and from all other attempts upon their re-
ligion, rights, and liberties” (Ishay 1997: 93). Although the English had successfully challenged the 
notion that kings ruled by divine right, the Bill perpetuates the idea that a small subset of the popu-
lation ought to rule over the commoners, provided they do so benevolently. 
11. Whereas the English Bill of Rights recognized the necessity for Protestants to “have arms for their 
defense suitable to their conditions” (Ishay 1997: 92), the first two amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States of America hoped that weapons would only be “necessary to the security of a 
free state,” since Congress could “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof” (Hamilton, et al. 1961: 542). 
12. As Glover (2001: 3) points out, “To talk of the twentieth-century atrocities is in one way mislead-
ing. It is a myth that barbarism is unique to the twentieth century: the whole of human history in-
cludes wars, massacres, and every kind of torture and cruelty: there are grounds for thinking that 
over much of the world the changes of the last hundred years or so have been towards a psycholog-
ical climate more humane than at any previous time. But it is still right that much of twentieth-cen-
tury history has been a very unpleasant surprise. Technology has made a difference. The decisions 
of a few people can mean horror and death for hundreds of thousands, even millions, of other peo-
ple. These events shock us not only by their scale. They also contrast with the expectations, at least 
in Europe, with which the twentieth century began.”
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